Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Damages for Medical Malpractice in Virginia by Goodman, Michael L. et al.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 3 Article 9
1999
Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Damages for
Medical Malpractice in Virginia
Michael L. Goodman
Kathryn Freeman-Jones
Kathleen M. McCauley
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael L. Goodman, Kathryn Freeman-Jones & Kathleen M. McCauley, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Damages for Medical
Malpractice in Virginia, 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 919 (1999).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/9
DAMAGES FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN VIRGINIA
Michael L. Goodman *
Kathryn Freeman-Jones
Kathleen M. McCauley ***
I. INTRODUCTION
As a general rule, a plaintiff in actions for personal injury and
wrongful death in Virginia, regardless of whether the cause derives
from medical malpractice, may state a claim for any medical
expenses incurred as a result of the alleged injury or death.1 By
definition, an expense is incurred when it has been paid or one
"become[s] legally obligated to pay it."2 A tortfeasor is bound and
obligated to make the plaintiff whole, which means the injured
party or his estate must be reasonably compensated for the fair and
reasonable value of incurred medical expenses.'
The burden always rests with the "plaintiff to prove the elements
of [his] damage ... with reasonable certainty. As a subset of this
concept, the damages need not be established with mathematical
precision, but the burden rests with the plaintiffto provide evidence
of facts and circumstances sufficient to permit the trier of fact to
intelligently estimate the degree and amount of damages sustained
by the injured party.' The defendant's burden throughout is to
reduce the amount of those damages that go to the jury for determi-
nation. Virginia has chosen, through legislation affirmed by
challenges to the supreme court, to regulate damages in medical
* Partner, Goodman, West & Filletti, PLLC, Glen Allen, Virginia. BA., 1977; J.D.,
1980, University of Virginia.
** Partner, Goodman, West & Filletti, PLLC, Glen Allen, Virginia. B.S.N., 1977; West
Virginia University; J.D., 1988, George Mason University.
*** Associate, Goodman, West & Filletti, PLLC, Glen Allen, Virginia. B.S., 1990; College
of William and Mary; J.D., 1995, Dickinson School of Law, The Pennsylvania State
University.
1. See Sykes v. Brown, 156 Va. 881, 159 S.E. 202 (1931).
2. Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 238 Va. 692,696,385 S.E.2d 612,615
(1989).
3. See Orebaugh v. Antonious, 190 Va. 829, 834, 58 S.E.2d 873, 879(1950).
4. Bulala v. Boyd, 239 Va. 218, 232-33, 389 S.E.2d 670, 685 (1990) (citing Gwaltney v.
Reed, 196 Va. 505, 507, 84 S.E.2d 501, 502 (1954)).
5. See Gwaltney, 196 Va. at 507-08, 84 S.E.2d at 503.
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malpractice cases in ways it has not applied to other personal injury
actions.
II. DAMAGES GENERALLY
Medical malpractice cases are divided into two categories-
personal injury and wrongful death.
In medical malpractice cases in Virginia, plaintiffs may allege
both special and general damages. Special damages include medical
expenses, lost wages, future lost earnings, future medical expenses,
and reasonable funeral and burial expenses, where applicable.
General damages include mental suffering of the beneficiaries,6
including sorrow, mental anguish and solace, society, companion-
ship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices, and advice of the decedent.
In a medical malpractice personal injury action, a plaintiff may
recover for personal pain and suffering, embarrassment, inconve-
nience, and disability, as applicable.
A. Theories of Recovery
1. Wrongful Death
At common law, no action for wrongful death existed in Virginia.
In 1871 the General Assembly enacted legislation creating a right
of action in a personal representative to enforce the decedent's claim
for any personal injury that caused death.7 It was not the intention
of the legislature to continue or to perpetuate the decedent's right
of action for the injury, but to substitute it and confer upon his
personal representative a new and original right of action.8 Virginia
law allows for the "survival" of a cause of action upon the death of
the person in whose favor the cause of action existed.9 However, the
law also requires "that if the cause of action asserted by the
decedent in his lifetime was for a personal injury and such decedent
dies as a result of the injury complained of," the action shall be
amended to a wrongful death action.' ° "[Tihe intent of the [wrongful
death] statute is not to accumulate an estate for the decedent," but
rather "to compensate [the] beneficiaries for their loss occasioned by
6. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
7. See id.
8. See Wilson v. Whittaker, 207 Va. 1032, 1038, 154 S.E.2d 124, 129 (1967).
9. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-25 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
10. Id.; see also id. § 8.01-56 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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the decedent's death."" The specific elements recoverable in a
wrongful death action are:
(1) mental suffering of beneficiaries;
(2) loss of income and services;
(3) expense of decedent's medical care;
(4) funeral expenses; and
(5) punitive damages. 2
Expenses for the decedent's medical care, funeral expenses, and
punitive damages must be itemized in the jury's verdict."3 In
medical malpractice wrongful death claims, the statutory cap
applies. 1
4
2. Personal Injury
Damages for personal injury are the "moneys awarded to the
person injured by the tort of another." 5 Damages in tort generally
include compensatory damages and punitive damages. Compensa-
tory damages are awarded to an individual as compensation for the
injury or harm caused by the tortfeasor. They can be pecuniary
(medical expenses, lost wages, or diminished earning capacity) or
nonpecuniary (pain and suffering or emotional distress). 6 Punitive
damages are generally awarded in an effort to punish and deter
conduct that is willful, wanton, or egregious in nature. Punitive
damages are not recoverable against the Commonwealth of Virginia
under the Virginia Tort Claims Act 7 and are inclusive in the
Medical Malpractice Cap on recovery. 8
11. Cassady v. Martin, 220 Va. 1093, 1101,266 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1980) (citation omitted).
12. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-52 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
13. See id.
14. See id. § 8.01-581.15 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 902 (1977). See generally DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQuiTY, RESTITUTION (2d ed. 1993); MARILYN K. MINZER ET AL.,
DAMAGES INTORTACTIONS (1982).
16. See Bowers v. Sprouse, 254Va. 428,492 S.E.2d 637 (1997). In personal injury actions,
it is inadequate as a matter of law to award the exact amount of plaintiff's medical expenses
and other special damages. See id.
17. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
18. See id. § 8.01-581.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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B. The Collateral Source Rule
It is a well-accepted principle under Virginia law that benefits
received by a plaintiff from sources wholly independent of and
collateral to the tortfeasor will not diminish the damages otherwise
recoverable from the tortfeasor. The Collateral Source Rule creates
a strategic balance between compensatory damages whose primary
objective is to make the plaintiff whole and disallowing the plaintiff
a windfall. The plaintiff is not entitled to an award that would
improve his or her position over what it would have been prior to the
defendant's alleged negligence. Accordingly, the plaintiff is to be
compensated fairly. The Collateral Source Rule embodies a public
policy judgment that favors the injured party over the tortfeasor. If
there is to be a windfall, it is to benefit the plaintiff, not the
defendant.
Similar public policy directed the long-standing evidentiary rule
that "insurance" is not to be mentioned by the plaintiff, his wit-
nesses, or counsel. 9 It is impermissible and is certain cause for a
mistrial or reversible error. Likewise, defendants are prohibited
from making direct or indirect reference to any financial burden
that might be imposed upon them. °
As a corollary to the Collateral Source Rule, rigorous debate has
arisen in Virginia over whether a plaintiff in a personal injury
action is entitled to recover those portions of the medical bills that
have been adjusted or otherwise "written off" by a health mainte-
nance organization, healthcare provider, Medicare/Medicaid, or any
private insurer.2' The Supreme Court of Virginia has not addressed
the issue, and legislators have made proposals that currently have
not found a statutory mandate. Plaintiffs contend that they have
incurred portions of medical bills that were written off by the
healthcare' provider since they would have been liable for those
amounts except for their good fortune to have health insurance. 2
Defendants on the other hand contend that plaintiffs incur only
those medical expenses that the healthcare providers accept as full
19. See Medina v. Hegerberg, 245 Va. 210, 213, 427 S.E.2d 343, 345 (1993).
20. See id.
21. See Richard E. Ladd, Jr. & ElizabethA. Roussel, ReducingPlaintiffsMedicalExpense
Damages: How Much Did the PlaintiffActually Incur?, 8 J. CIV. LrrIG. 213 (1996) (providing
an excellent overview of the current posture of the Collateral Source Rule in Virginia).
22. See, e.g., Hepper v. Mende, 46 Va. Cir. 395, 395 (Richmond City 1998).
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payment.23 Traditionally, they do not attack the amount paid to the
healthcare providers by the collateral source, but rather argue that
the Collateral Source Rule is not implicated since no one has paid
the written-off portions of the medical bills.24
Under Virginia's Collateral Source Rule, a tortfeasor is not
relieved of the burden to compensate a plaintiff for losses incurred
although those losses are paid by another." The supreme court has
held that any expense is "incurred" when it has been paid or one is
legally obligated to pay it. 26
C. Emotional Distress Claims
It is a well-established rule that there is no claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress in Virginia.2" Specifically, there is no
recovery for emotional distress unless it results directly from a
tortiously caused physical injury." There are few exceptions to this
general rule. These exceptions have been carved out primarily by
three cases: Hughes v. Moore,2" Womack v. Eldridge, ° and most
recently, Naccash v. Burger.31
In the Hughes case, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
where there is no evidence of "willful, wanton, or vindictive" conduct
and there is no "physical impact ... there can be no recovery for
emotional injury alone."32 The Hughes exception applies where
emotional distress and a physical injury are claimed and the
physical injury is the natural result of the emotional disturbance.3
Specifically, the court held that "there may be recovery for negligent
conduct, notwithstanding the lack of physical impact, provided the
injured party properly pleads and proves by clear and convincing
evidence that his physical injury was the natural result of fright or
23. See Ladd & Roussel, supra note 21, at 217.
24. See id. at 214-17.
25. See Schickling v. Aspinall, 235 Va. 472, 474, 369 S.E.2d 172, 174(1988).
26. See Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 238 Va. 692,696,385 S.E.2d 612,
615 (1989).
27. See Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 415, 290 S.E.2d 825, 835 (1982); Womack v.
Eldridge, 215 Va. 338,342,210 S.E.2d 145, 150 (1974); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27,36, 197
S.E.2d 214, 227 (1973).
28. See Naccash, 223 Va. at 415, 290 S.E.2d at 835.
29. 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973).
30. 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974).
31. 223 Va. 406,290 S.E.2d 825 (1982).
32. Hughes, 214 Va. at 34, 197 S.E.2d at 220.
33. See id.
1999]
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shock proximately caused by the defendant's negligence."34 The
court made it clear, however, that this new rule does not allow
recovery "for physical injuries resulting from fright or shock caused
by witnessing injury to another, allegedly occasioned by the
negligence of a defendant toward a third person."
35
The second exception to the general rule regarding recovery for
emotional distress was carved out by the supreme court in Womack.
In order to recover for emotional distress unaccompanied by a
physical injury, the Womack court held that the plaintiff must prove
the following elements:
(1) the conduct was intentional or reckless;
(2) the conduct was outrageous and intolerable in that it offends
against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality;
(3) there was a causal connection between the defendant's conduct
and the emotional distress; and
(4) the emotional distress was severe. 6
The third exception to the general rule in Virginia has been
carved out by the supreme court in Naccash. In Naccash, the court
held that parents of an infant with Tay-Sachs disease were entitled
to recover for emotional damages as a result of the defendant health
care providers' negligence.3 7 However, inNaccash, which was a case
for wrongful birth, the parents were compensated for emotional
distressbecause they were deprived of the opportunity to reject or
accept the continuance of a pregnancy that resulted in the birth of
their fatally defective child. 8
The court held that there are four essential elements to the
recognition of a cause of action for emotional distress:
(1) the plaintiff must prove the defendant owed him a duty;
(2) there was a breach of the duty owed;
(3) plaintiff must show a causal connection between the breach of
the duty and the injury itself; and
34. Id.
35. Id. at 34-35.
36. See Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 150 (1974).
37. See Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 414-15, 290 S.E.2d 825, 829-30 (1982).
38. See id. at 415, 290 S.E.2d at 830.
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(4) there must exist an actionable direct injury.3 9
The first element of this cause of action was satisfied in the
Naccash case because the defendant healthcare providers owed a
duty to Mr. Burger as he, himself, was a patient.4 ° The second
element required that the plaintiff prove a breach of the duty owed.
Because the testing performed on Mr. Burger was done negligently,
plaintiff satisfied this second element.4'
Finally, the Naccash court required that the plaintiff prove a
direct injury as a result of the alleged negligence. The direct injury
to the Burgers was the loss of a chance to decide whether to proceed
with a pregnancy or terminate it due to defects in the fetus.42 In
essence, this case was one for wrongful birth and allowed recovery
for any emotional distress causally connected to the wrongful birth.
Most recently, the supreme court unequivocally decided that there
is no cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
when a parent merely witnesses an alleged tortious act committed
upon her child.43 The court opined that the threshold issue is
whether the tortfeasor owed a duty to the parent plaintiff, a third-
party bystander." Unlike the facts in Naccash, the healthcare
provider in the Gray case had no physician-patient relationship with
Mrs. Gray. She was merely witnessing the care and treatment
provided to her three-year-old daughter, and therefore, the health-
care provider owed no duty of care to her.45 Accordingly, there
existed no cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress for witnessing a tortious act, and defendant INOVA's
demurrer was properly sustained by the trial court.46
Despite the three limited exceptions to the general rule, there is
generally no recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress in
Virginia-once again, further evidence that Virginia takes a very
conservative approach to recovery in tort, which extends to recovery
in actions for medical negligence.
39. See id.
40. See id. The defendant physician performed an invasive procedure and genetic testing
on Mr. Burger. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 416, 290 S.E.2d at 831.
43. See Gray v. INOVA Health Care Servs., 257 Va. 597, 598,514 S.E.2d 355,356 (1999).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
1999]
UNIVERSITYOF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:919
D. Breach of Confidentiality
There has been "much ado" in recent years with respect to breach
of confidentiality claims in the healthcare setting. In 1997, the
Supreme Court of Virginia recognized a cause of action for breach of
confidentiality against a healthcare provider who disseminated a
patient's medical records to third parties without the patient's
express authorization.47 While there are statutes in Virginia that set
forth what information can be disseminated and when,' the
supreme court has held that absent such statutory authority to the
contrary, a healthcare provider owes a duty to his patient not to
disclose confidential medical information without the patient's
permission.49
In Fairfax Hospital v. Curtis," Patricia Curtis's medical records
were disseminated attendant to a pending malpractice litigation.5'
She filed a Motion for Judgment against Fairfax Hospital and
others.52 In response, defendant filed a demurrer and plea in bar,
asserting that the plaintiff waived any right to privacy when she
filed the civil lawsuit.5" Curtis's medical condition, however was not
at issue in the pending litigation. Instead, it was the physical
condition of and medical treatment rendered to her infant that were
at issue in the underlying malpractice case. 54 Accordingly, the trial
court overruled the demurrer and held that Curtis had not waived
her right to privacy and was entitled to damages. 55 The parties
stipulated the relevant facts and damages at $100,000, and the trial
court entered judgment in plaintiff's favor.56
47. See Fairfax Hosp. v. Curtis, 254 Va. 437, 445, 492 S.E.2d 642, 645-46 (1997).
48. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399 (Cum. Supp. 1999) (addressing communications
between physicians and patients); id. § 8.01-413 (addressing certain copies of healthcare
provider's records or papers of patient); id. § 32.1-36.1 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (addressing
confidentiality of test for HIV); id. § 32.1-116.3 (Repl. Vol. 1997) (addressing the reporting of
communicable diseases); id. § 32.1-127.1:03 (Cum. Supp. 1999) (addressing patient health
records privacy); id. § 53.1-133.03 (Repl. Vol. 1998) (addressing the exchange of medical and
mental health information and records by the Department of Corrections); Confidentiality of
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records, 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.1 to .67 (1998).
49. See Curtis, 254 Va. at 442, 492 S.E.2d at 645.
50. 254 Va. 437, 492 S.E.2d 642 (1997).
51. See id. at 439, 492 S.E.2d at 643.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 445, 492 S.E.2d at 646.
55. See id. at 440-41, 492 S.E.2d at 643.
56. See id.
926
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The supreme court heard the case on appeal and held that
included in a healthcare provider's duty to his patient is the
provider's obligation to keep confidential all information learned
from the patient directly or during the course of care and treatment
of the patient.57 Accordingly, absent statutory authority to the
contrary or serious danger to the patient or others, a healthcare
provider may not disclose confidential information about a patient
without authorization.58 A breach of this duty gives rise to an action
in tort. Damages in such a breach of confidentiality case consist of
emotional distress and related general damages.59
III. THE STATUTORY CAP
Virginia law limits recovery for damages associated with medical
malpractice litigation in accordance with the Medical Malpractice
Act.6" The Medical Malpractice Act provided for a $1 million cap on
recovery until this year, when the Virginia General Assembly and
Governor James S. Gilmore signed legislation raising the cap on
recovery." As of August 1, 1999, the medical malpractice cap
increased to $1,500,000. Each subsequent year, the cap will be
raised by $50,000, until 2007 and 2008 when it will increase by
$75,000, and the total damages recoverable under Virginia law in a
medical malpractice action will be $2,000,000.62 This statutory cap
applies to alleged acts of medical negligence occurring on or after
the effective date of the increase.63 All causes of action accruing
before August 1, 1999, will remain subject to the $1,000,000 cap.'
The medical malpractice cap limits the total amount recoverable
for any injury or death regardless of the number of defendant
healthcare providers. Prejudgment interest and punitive damages
continue to be subject to the cap. The medical malpractice cap only
57. See id. at 442, 492 S.E.2d at 644.
58. See id. at 442, 492 S.E.2d at 645.
59. See id. at 446,492 S.E.2d at 647.
60. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1 to -581.19:1 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cur. Supp. 1999).
61. See id. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1999). This section was amended
by the 1999 Virginia General Assembly, raising the statutory cap to $1,500,000. See id. (Cum.
Supp. 1999). In 1983, the GeneralAssembly amended the cap raising the limitfrom $750,000
to $1,000,000. See id. (Rep. Vol. 1992).
62. See id. (Cum. Supp. 1999).
63. See id.
64. See id.
19991
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applies to a verdict against a healthcare provider as defined by the
General Assembly.65
A- Punitive Damages
In Virginia, punitive damages awards are limited to $350,000.66
While ajury may award more than $350,000, ajudge will reduce the
total verdict in a medical malpractice case to the statutory cap of
$1,500,000, including the punitive damages award 7 . The statutory
limitation is for punitive damages against all defendants.68
B. Prejudgment Interest
Historically, there was no Virginia state or federal court decision
that definitively stated whether prejudgment interest was included
within the medical malpractice cap; however, a comparison of the
two statutes was instructive. Comparing the language of the
prejudgment interest statute69 to that of Virginia Code section 8.0 1-
581.15, practitioners concluded that by its very terms, prejudgment
interest is included within the limits of the cap.
70
65. See id. § 8.01-581.1 (Gum. Supp. 1999).
"Health care provider" means (i) a person, corporation, facility or institution licensed
by this Commonwealth to provide health care or professional services as a physician
or hospital, dentist, pharmacist, registered nurse or licensed practical nurse,
optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physical therapist, physical therapy assistant,
clinical psychologist, clinical social worker, professional counselor, licensed dental
hygienist or health maintenance organization, (ii) a professional corporation, all of
whose shareholders or members are so licensed, (iii) a partnership, all of whose
partners are so licensed, (iv) a nursing home as defined in § 54.1-3100 except those
nursing institutions conducted by and for those who rely upon treatment by spiritual
means alone through prayer in accordance with a recognized church or religious
denomination, (v) a professional limited liability company comprised of members as
described in § 13.1-1102 A 2, or an officer, employee or agent thereof acting in the
course and scope of his employment, or (vi) a corporation, partnership, limited
liability company or any other entity, except a state-operated facility, which employs
or engages a licensed health care provider and which primarily renders health care
services.
Id.
66. See id. § 8.01-38.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id. § 8.01-382 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
70. VA. CODE ANN. section 8.01-382 (Cum. Supp. 1999) provides that "the verdict of the
jury... may provide for interest on any principal sum awarded." Id. (emphasis added). VA.
CODE ANN. section 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1999) provides that:
[i]n any verdict returned against a health care provider in an action for malpractice
... which is tried by a jury or in any judgment entered against a health care provider
in such an action which is tried without a jury, the total amount recoverable for any
injury to, or death of, a patient shall not exceed $1,500,000.
Id. § 8.01-581.15 (Cum. Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
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Because Virginia Code section 8.01-581.15 expressly limits the
verdict in a malpractice case to $1,500,000, and because Virginia
Code section 8.01-382 provides that the verdict of the jury may
include prejudgment interest, the statutory language supported the
conclusion that the malpractice cap includes such prejudgment
interest. The issue was resolved in January 1999, when the
Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that prejudgment interest was in
fact included within the limit imposed by section 8.01-581.15.' The
1999 amendments to Virginia Code section 8.01-581.15 recognize the
inclusion of both punitive damages and prejudgment interest in the
limit on liability.
C. The Constitutionality of the Medical Malpractice Cap
The constitutionality of the cap has been challenged several times.
Most recently, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the constitu-
tionality of the cap in Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services. 2 In
the Pulliam opinion, the court upheld its previous decision in
Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals,3 stating that the cap does
not violate procedural due process, substantive due process, the
Equal Protection Clause,"4 the right to a jury trial, 5 the province of
the judiciary, 6 or constitute the taking of property. With respect
to the issue of prohibition against special legislation, the court
refused to consider plaintiffs argument as the issue was raised for
the first time at oral argument. 8 Plaintiff failed to address the issue
in the record at the trial court level, in his petition for appeal, or in
the appellate briefs.7'9 Accordingly, the issue was not decided by the
Pulliam court.8"
71. See Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs., 257 Va. 1, 25, 509 S.E.2d 307,321 (1999).
72. See id. at 7, 509 S.E. 2d at 310.
73. 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989).
74. See Pulliam, 257 Va. at 21, 509 S.E.2d at 318.
75. See id. at 15, 509 S.E.2d at 315.
76. See id. at 23, 509 S.E.2d at 319.
77. See id. at 20, 509 S.E.2d at 318.
78. See id. at 16, 509 S.E.2d at 316.
79. See id.
80. See id.
1999]
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IV. STATE AND FEDERAL STATUTES AFFECTING A MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIM
A. Virginia Tort Claims Act
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is firmly rooted in the law of
the Commonwealth of Virginia."' This doctrine states that absent
statutory (or constitutional) language to the contrary, the Common-
wealth, its agencies, entities, counties, cities, and towns, are
immune from liability for the tortious acts of its agents, servants,
and employees.8 2 Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
physicians and other healthcare providers may be immune from
liability for acts of simple negligence,8" if they are employed by the
Commonwealth and meet certain criteria established through the
judicial system.84 The criterion examined by the courts have been set
forth as a four-prong test as follows:
(1) [t]he nature of the function performed by the employee;
(2) the extent of the state's interest and involvement in the
function;
(3) the degree of control and direction exercised by the state over
the employee; and
(4) whether the act complained of involved the use of judgment
and discretion.8
In 1982, the Virginia General Assembly enacted the Virginia Tort
Claims Act, 6 which provides, in limited circumstances, the waiver
of the Commonwealth's immunity from civil liability for the tortious
conduct of its employees.8 7 The Act provides that:
the Commonwealth shall be liable for claims for money only accruing
on or after July 1, 1982, and any transportation district shall be liable
for claims for money only accruing on or after July 1, 1986, on account
81. See Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 307, 321 S.E.2d 657, 660 (1984).
82. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.2 (Repl. Vol. 1992). 'Employee' means any officer,
employee, or agent of any agency, or any person acting on behalf of any agency in an official
capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the Commonwealth, or any
transportation district, whether with or without compensation." Id.
83. Healthcare providers are not immune from intentional torts. See James v. Jane, 221
Va. 43, 51-54, 282 S.E.2d 864, 868-70 (1980).
84. See id.
85. See id. at 53, 282 S.E.2d at 869.
86. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-195.1 to 195.9 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cure. Supp. 1999).
87. For a definition of employee, see supra note 82.
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of damage to or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee while acting
within the scope of his employment under circumstances where the
Commonwealth or transportation district, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death.11
The statute limits each claimant's recovery to $100,000 (for all
claims arising after July 1, 1993), including claims for medical
malpractice.8 9 Claims against the Commonwealth involving medical
malpractice are subject to the provisions of Virginia Code sections
8.01-581.1 to -581.20.9" Recovery in medical malpractice claims
brought against employees of the Commonwealth who are not
entitled to sovereign immunity are limited by the provisions of
section 8.01-581.15.91 The Commonwealth is not liable for prejudg-
ment interest or for punitive damages.92
In order to proceed against the Commonwealth, certain procedural
requirements must be met. First, the claimant must file a written
statement of the nature of the claim, which includes the time and
place at which the injury is alleged to have occurred and the
agencies alleged to be liable. 3 This statement must be filed with the
Director of the Division of Risk Management or the Attorney
General within one year after such cause of action accrued.94
However, if the claimant was under a disability at the time the
cause of action accrued, the tolling provisions of section 8.01-229
apply.95
The notice of claim must be mailed by certified mail to the
Director of the Division of Risk Management or the Attorney
General in Richmond.96 The date on which the return receipt is
signed by the Director or the Attorney General is prima facie
evidence of the date of filing for purposes of compliance with this
section.9" Thereafter, an action may be commenced either (1) upon
denial of the claim by the Attorney General or the Director of the
Division of Risk Management or (2) after the expiration of six
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
89. See id.
90. See id. § 8.01-195.6 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
91. See id. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp 1999).
92. See id. § 8.01-195.3 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
93. See id. § 8.01-195.6 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
94. See id.
95. See id.; see also id. § 8.01-229 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
96. See id. § 8.01-195.6 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
97. See id.
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months from the date of filing of the notice of claim unless, within
that period, the claim has been compromised and discharged.9 "All
claims against the Commonwealth ... are forever barred unless
such action is commenced within eighteen months of the filing of the
notice of claim."99 Claims against the Commonwealth involving
medical malpractice shall be subject to the provisions of the Virginia
Tort Claims Act.' 0 The recovery in such a claim involving medical
malpractice shall not exceed the limits imposed by section 8.01-
195.3.101
B. Charitable Hospitals in Virginia
Tort liability of hospitals is controlled by Virginia Code section
8.01-38, which states that no hospital shall be immune from liability
unless (1) the hospital renders exclusively charitable medical care
and treatment or (2) the individual alleging tortious conduct on
behalf of the hospital was accepted as a patient at the institution
under an "express written agreement executed by the hospital and
delivered at the time of admission to the patient.., providing that
all medical services furnished such patient are to be supplied on a
charitable basis without financial liability to the patient."0 2
However, with respect to the medical malpractice cap and the
provisions of Virginia Code section 8.01-581.15, hospitals that are
exempt from taxation in accordance with section 501(c)(3) of title 26
of the U.S. Code shall not be liable for damages in excess of the
limits of its insurance coverage.0 3 These facilities are only liable for
damages totaling the lesser of the limits of its insurance policy or
$1,000,000.104 Interestingly, when the General Assembly amended
Virginia Code section 8.01-581.15, it did not consider the effect on
Virginia Code section 8.01-38. Accordingly, the medical malpractice
cap remains $1,000,000 as to all U.S. Code section 501(c)(3)
facilities. 05
98. See id.
99. Id. § 8.01-195.7 (Rep. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
100. See id. § 8.01-195.3 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
101. See id. § 8.01-195.6 (Rep. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
102. Id. § 8.01-38 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
103. See id.
104. See id. § 8.01-581.15 (Rep. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
105. According to the Virginia Hospital and Health Care Association, there are 95 acute
care facilities in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Of these 95 facilities, 81 are United States
Code section 501(c)(3) hospitals. Therefore, Virginia Code section 8.01-581.15, as amended,
applies to only 14 hospitals in Virginia. The remaining 81 are subject to the $1,000,000 limit
on liability.
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C. The Virginia Birth Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Act
In 1987, the Virginia General Assembly enacted the Virginia
Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act (the "Act")." 6
The purpose of the Act is to limit the liability exposure of obstetri-
cians and hospitals'07 to medical malpractice claims arising out of
birth-related disabilities caused by oxygen deprivation or mechani-
cal injury.' The Act expressly excludes cases arising from genetic
abnormalities, degenerative neurological diseases, or maternal
substance abuse."°9 The Act became effective on January 1, 1988,
and created the Birth-Related Neurological Injury Program (the
"Program").110
The Act is the exclusive remedy for a child filing suit against a
particular participating physician or hospital."' Like the medical
malpractice cap, the Supreme Court of Virginia has upheld the Act's
constitutionality."' 2
The Workers' Compensation Commission hears individual claims
under the Act. Claimants may retain counsel for purposes of this
petition and the Program is represented by the Attorney General's
office. Each claim is reviewed by a panel of medical school faculty
physicians. The panel hears evidence and submits a report to the
Workers' Compensation Commission concluding that the infant's
injuries were or were not birth-related. The parties are bound by the
Commission's finding."'
While the Act covers both participating physicians and participat-
ing hospitals, it does not cover private or professional corporations.
Accordingly, a participating physician (an individual covered by the
106. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
107. VA. CODE ANN. section 38.2-5001 (Repl. Vol. 1999) defines "participating hospital."
This definition was amended in 1995 to include "employees of such hospitals, excluding
physicians or nurse mid-wives who are eligible to qualify as participating physicians, acting
in the course of and in the scope of their employment." Id. § 38.2-5001 (Repl. Vol. 1999). In
addition to obstetricians, the statute includes family practitioners and nurse-midwives who
provide obstetrical services. See id. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
108. See id.
109. See id. § 38.2-5001 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
110. See id. § 38.2-5014 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
111. See id. § 38.2-5002(B) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
112. See King v. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program, 242
Va. 404, 412,410 S.E.2d 656, 661 (1991).
113. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5008(A)(6) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
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Act) does not shield the corporation (an uncovered employer).
Virginia Code section 38.2-5001 defines "participating physician"
and "participating hospital"; however, the definition does not include
a physician's professional corporation." 4 While a professional
corporation is a legally distinct health care provider as defined in
Virginia Code section 8.01-581.1, as the Act presently reads, such an
entity is not eligible for participation in the Program. Support for
this proposition is found in the Act itself, which restricts and
conditions all awards to those who had "services rendered by a
participating doctor or hospital."" 5 While coverage is afforded to
those physicians and hospitals that participate in the Program,
many physicians have not become participants because they do not
want to pay, or cannot afford to pay, the annual assessment fee,
which is currently set at $5,000.116
Unlike damage awards in medical negligence cases, there is no
cap on recovery for damages awarded by the Workers' Compensation
Commission under the Act." 7 The Act does exclude third-party
payments."' However, the Commission's award should include all
medical and rehabilitation expenses, other expenses associated with
the infant's condition, and loss of earnings (50 percent of average
private, non-farm worker earnings) calculated from age eighteen to
age sixty-five. The claimant may also recover attorneys' fees.19
The statue of limitations for claims under the Act is ten years
from the date of birth. 2 ° Unlike medical malpractice claims, the
continuing treatment rule does not apply to claims made under the
Program. It is important to remember, however, that the treating
physician must have participated in the Program during the year of
the claimant's birth.'2 ' Because recovery under the Act is an
exclusive remedy, claimants may not sue a participating physician
or a participating hospital in court once he has elected a remedy
under the Program. 2 However, the claimant may sue a nonpartici-
114. See id. § 38.2-5001 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
115. Id. § 38.2-5009 (Repl. Vol. 1999); see also King v. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological
Injury Compensation Program, 242 Va. 404, 410 S.E.2d 656 (1991).
116. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5020(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
117. See id. § 38.2-5009 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
118. See id.
119. See id. § 38.2-5009(4) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
120. See id. § 38.2-5013 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
121. See id. § 38.2-5009 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
122. See id. § 38.2-5002(B) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
934
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
pating physician or hospital for damages allegedly arising out of
medical negligence.'"
'Because the Program operates under the auspices of the Indus-
trial Commission, the process is a no-fault system. Accordingly, if a
payment is made to a claimant based on the Commission's findings,
there is no report generated to the National Practitioner Data
Bank." The statutory definition that determines whether a
neurologically impaired child may participate in the Fund is so
narrow that most children do not meet the criteria, and the claim is
adjudicated in court as a medical malpractice suit.
D. COBRA/EMTALA
Congress passed the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act ("COBRA)') on April 7, 1986. Its provisions were remedial in
nature and amended the Medicare statute26 requiring all hospitals
enrolled in the Medicare program to treat and stabilize all patients
regardless of their ability to pay for services. In short, COBRA
imposes liability for failure to treat or stabilize a patient brought to
a facility in an emergency medical condition.'27 The statute is now
more commonly known as the Emergency Treatment and Active
Labor Act ("EMTALA")."23
The Act applies to any hospital that participates and receives
payments through the federal Medicare program. EMTALA's
requirements apply to any patient whether or not he/she is eligible
to receive Medicare benefits.'29 It strictly prohibits hospitals from
delaying or denying treatment until inquiries regarding healthcare
insurance coverage are made. 3 ' It also prohibits hospitals from
denying medical testing or screening for conditions of a medically
emergent nature due to lack of insurance coverage. 31 The Act
should be construed liberally. 32
123. See id. § 38.2-5002(D) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
124. See id. § 38.2-5009 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (1992).
126. See id. § 1395.
127. See id. § 1395dd(c)(1), (e)(1).
128. See id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(a), (d)(2)(a).
129. See id. § 1395dd(a), (b)(1).
130. See id. § 1395dd(b)(1).
131. See id.
132. See McGee v. Funderburg, 17 F.3d 1122, 1124 (8th Cir. 1994).
1999] 935
936 UNIVERSITYOF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:919
EMTALA imposes two types of duties that give rise to two
separate types of claims. First, if a patient arrives at an emergency
room and requests treatment, the hospital must provide an
"appropriate medical screening examination" to identify whether a
medical emergency exists. 13 3 Second, a hospital may not transfer a
patient who has an "emergency medical condition which has fiot
been stabilized" unless certain conditions have been met. 34
When a hospital fails to comply with its own internal standards
and refuses to treat a patient for economic reasons, liability is clear.
However, most EMTALA claims are less obvious. In order to prevail
on a COBRA/EMTALA claim, the plaintiff must prove three
elements:
(1) that failure to treat the patient was directly related to the
patient's lack of insurance coverage; 3 5
(2) that the underlying violation relates to allegations of substan-
dard care and treatment including, but not limited to, improper
transfer, failure to perform requisite screening and other diagnostic
tests, or discharge from the facility that was not medically indi-
cated; and
(3) an injury. 136
It remains unclear whether damage awards for EMTALA
violations are limited by Virginia's statutory cap on medical
malpractice damages. Courts are divided on the issue and have
generally adopted three positions. First, some courts have held that
since the federal standard incorporates general personal injury
principles on recovery, and not those specifically applicable in
medical malpractice actions, EMTALA claimants may recover over
and above the state limit.13 This approach is premised on the fact
that EMTALA is not designed to replicate the Medical Malpractice
Act. 38 Second, some courts have held that because federal law
claims rely on state law damage principles, and EMTALA claims
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1991).
134. Id. § 1395dd(c)(1).
135. See Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433, 435 (D. Kan. 1990).
136. See Smith v. Richmond Mem'l Hosp., 243 Va. 445, 449-55, 416 S.E.2d 689, 691-94
(1992).
137. See Power v. Arlington Hosp., 800 F. Supp. 1384, 1388-89 (E.D. Va. 1992), affd in
part, rev'd in part, Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n, 42 F.3d 851 (4th Cir. 1994).
138. See Power, 800 F. Supp. at 1388-89.
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arise out of medical care and treatment, the malpractice cap should
apply to recovery in EMTALA claims.'39
Finally, the third approach relies on whether state malpractice
caps are interpreted broadly or limited in their application. The
Fourth Circuit held in Power v. Arlington Hospital Association that
Virginia's malpractice cap has been broadly applied and even limits
recovery in cases involving battery and sexual harassment claims
against healthcare providers. 4 ° Therefore, the Court held that the
cap should also include claims brought in Virginia under
COBRA/EMTALA." In a case related to Power v. Arlington
Hospital, the plaintiff sued additional healthcare providers not
named in the original suit.'42 The court held that EMTALA does not
permit stacking of multiple defendants for multiple caps that defeat
plaintiffs limit on recovery under Virginia Code section 8.01-
581.15.43
V. CONCLUSION
Historically, substantive tort law has not dwelled upon the issue
of damages, but in recent years, legislatures, courts, the public, and
the media have focused increasingly on medical malpractice
damages. Reform statutes, particularly where insurance premiums
have been an issue, have capped recoveries. While Virginia has
limited recovery for punitive and medical malpractice damages,
other states have restricted recoveries on all noneconomic damages
in personal injury actions."M Suffice it to say that the controversy
has just begun to address monetary compensation for pain, suffer-
ing, mental distress, and the imposition of quasi-criminal punitive
damages for alleged medical negligence. Virginia, far from the
cutting edge, has taken a conservative and measured approach to
addressing damages for personal injury.
139. See Lee v. Allegheny Reg'l Hosp. Corp., 778 F. Supp. 900, 904 (W.D. Va. 1991).
140. See Power, 42 F.3d at 861.
141. See id.
142. See Power v. Alexandria Physicians Group, 887 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd,
91 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1996).
143. See id. at 852; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp.
1999).
144. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997) (limiting noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice claims to $250,000); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PRoc. § 11-108 (Repl.
Vol. 1998) (limiting noneconomic damages in personal injury actions to $500,000 for causes
of action arising on or after October 1, 1994).
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